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INTRODUCTION 
The states of the Americas have a long history of support for 
democracy and the human rights related to democracy. They have 
expressed this support through treaties, resolutions and declarations, and 
these democratic rights have been further interpreted and developed by 
the organs of the Organization of American States (OAS). From early, 
pre-OAS treaties such as the 1907 Additional Convention to the General 
Treaty of Peace and Amity, 1 to the more recent Charter of the 
Organization of American States, the American Convention on Human 
Rights and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
States of the Americas have sought to promote and protect 
representative democracy.2 These treaties protect important democratic 
rights and freedoms including those concerning thought, conscience, 
opinion, expression, peaceful assembly, association, and participation in 
government and public affairs. They also provide the more solid 
guarantees that are required to flesh out democracy, including the rights 
of citizens to hold, to vote in, and to otherwise take part in, periodic 
• Dr. David S. Berry is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the University of the West 
Indies, an Advisor to the Attorney General of Barbados on matters of international law and 
recently was appointed as an ICSID arbitrator. The views expressed herein are the author's 
own and are not to be attributed to any Caribbean state or other entity. 
1. See Additional Convention to the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, art. 1, Dec. 
20, 1907, 2 AM. J. INT'L. L. SUPP. 229, 229-30 (1908). 
2. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1, as 
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, O.A.S.T.S No. 1-A, OEA/Ser. 
A/2(SEPF)Add., by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 66, 
OEA/Ser.A/41 (SEPF), by the Protocol of Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, 1-E Rev. OEA 
Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3 (SEPF), and by the Protocol of Managua, June 
10, 1993, 1-F Rev. OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.4 (SEPF), the integrated 
text reflecting all four amendments available at 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ch 
arter.html (last visited February 6, 2006) [hereinafter OAS Charter]; American Convention 
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, P.A.U.T.S. No. 69. The final three 
treaties are each reprinted in General Secretariat to the OAS, Basic Documents Pertaining to 
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/1.4 rev. 10 (May 31, 2004). 
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elections. The rights and guarantees in these treaties are further 
elaborated in, and may be interpreted by, the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man. 3 
In the last 25 years, however, the Member States of the 
Organization of American States have allowed democracy to play an 
even stronger role in the operation of the Organization. Several 
resolutions, declarations, and an amendment to the OAS Charter have 
made a non-democratic transition of government a ground for 
suspension of a Member State's right to participate in either the 
Organization of American States or Summit of the Americas. This 
process started with Resolution 1080 on "Representative Democracy" in 
1991,4 and was further grounded and developed in the Protocol of 
Washington of 1992, 5 the Declaration of Quebec City of 2001, 6 and the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001.7 Through these acts the 
3. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Res. XXX, Final Act, Ninth 
International Conference of American States, 1948, 43 AM. J. INT'L. L. SUPP. 133, 138 
(1949). Although technically non-binding, the Declaration is now recognized as fulfilling 
the important role of being an authoritative guide to the interpretation of the phrase 
"fundamental rights of the individual" that is found in Articles 3(1) and 17 of the OAS 
Charter. Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within 
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-10/89, Jul. 14, 1989, Inter-Am C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, paras. 41-47. 
4. Representative Democracy, General Assembly of the OAS [hereinafter OAS G.A.] 
AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), June 5, 1991, http://www.oas.org (follow "Welcome" 
hyperlink; then follow "Documents & Reports" hyperlink to "Resolutions and Declarations 
- AG - General Assembly" and choose "Resolutions Before 1995"; then follow "AG/Res. 
1080 (XXI-0/91" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
5. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States, Dec. 
14, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 1005 [hereinafter Protocol of Washington]. Article 1 of the Protocol of 
Washington added a new Article 9 to the OAS Charter, which provides, in part: 
Id. 
A Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has 
been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to 
participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the 
Councils of the Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the 
commissions, working groups, and any other bodies established. 
6. Third Summit of the Americas, Apr. 22, 2001, Declaration of Quebec City, 
http://www.summit-americas.org (follow "The Summit Process" hyperlink; then follow 
"Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
7. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11, 
2001, OAS Doc. OEA/SerP/AG/Res.l (2001), 28th Spec. Sess., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/ 
AG/Res.1 (XXVIIl-E/01) (OAS General Assembly) (Sept. 11, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1289 (2001) 
[hereinafter Democratic Charter], available at http://www.oas.org (follow "Welcome" 
hyperlink; then follow "Documents & Reports" hyperlink and choose "Democratic 
Charter") (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). Articles 20-21 of the Democratic Charter provide: 
Article 20 
In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that 
seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the 
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states of the Americas have accepted that unconstitutional alterations or 
disruptions of their democratic orders may provide the grounds for 
intense scrutiny, and perhaps intervention, by the OAS or the Summit of 
the Americas. 8 Further, this scrutiny may in turn result in suspension of 
their rights to participate in those bodies. 
This paper briefly examines the practical implications of such 
democratic procedures in the Americas. It suggests that despite the 
availability of these potentially robust checks on non-democratic 
transitions, their meaningful implementation remains problematic. 
Focusing on the legal actions taken by the Organization of American 
States and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in response to the 
departure of Jean-Bertrand Aristide from Haiti in late February 2004, 
Secretary General may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council 
to undertake a collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it 
deems appropriate. 
The Permanent Council, depending on the situation, may undertake the necessary 
diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy. 
If such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or if the urgency of the situation so 
warrants, the Permanent Council shall immediately convene a special session of the 
General Assembly. The General Assembly will adopt the decisions it deems 
appropriate, including the undertaking of diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with 
the Charter of the Organization, international law, and the provisions of this 
Democratic Charter. 
The necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration 
of democracy, will continue during the process. Id. 
Article 21 
When the special session of the General Assembly determines that there has been an 
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order of a member state, and that 
diplomatic initiatives have failed, the special session shall take the decision to 
suspend said member state from the exercise of its right to participate in the OAS by 
an affirmative vote of two thirds of the member states in accordance with the 
Charter of the OAS. The suspension shall take effect immediately. 
The suspended member state shall continue to fulfill its obligations to the 
Organization, in particular its human rights obligations. 
Notwithstanding the suspension of the member state, the Organization will maintain 
diplomatic initiatives to restore democracy in that state. Id. 
8. For an analysis of the pro-democratic norms of the Inter-American system, see, e.g., 
Stephen J. Schnably, Constitutionalism and Democratic Government in the Inter-American 
System, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-98 (Gregory H. Fox & 
Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Dinah Shelton, Representative Democracy and Human Rights in 
the Western Hemisphere, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 353 (1991). For analysis of the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter, see, e.g., Timothy D. Rudy, A Quick Look at the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter of the OAS: What is it and is it "Legal"?, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & 
COM. 237 (2005); See also Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, The Third Summit of the 
Americas and the Thirty-first Session of the OAS General Assembly, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 173 
(2002). For an exploration of the difficulties associated with "democratic intervention" by 
regional organizations, see e.g., Stephen J. Schnably, The OAS and Constitutionalism: 
Lessons From Recent West African Experience, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 263 
(2005). 
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this paper suggests that regional organizations in the Americas and 
Caribbean continue to face both substantive and procedural challenges 
in their implementation of the "right to democracy" of the peoples of 
the Americas.9 
I. ARISTIDE'S DEPARTURE 
On February 29, 2004, at 6:15 a.m., President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide departed from Haiti on a Boeing 757, escorted by U.S. 
soldiers.10 The events surrounding President Aristide' s departure are 
fairly well established. However the meaning of that departure-
whether it was a rescue or abduction-remains a subject of deep 
controversy.1 1 Importantly, views also differ about the validity of 
Aristide' s hasty and informal resignation immediately prior to his 
departure. If considered effective, it would serve as a foundation for 
future democratic transitions; if considered ille~itimate, it would not 
support a democratic, constitutional transition. 1 This latter area of 
uncertainty clearly raises the question as to whether there was an 
unconstitutional alteration or disruption of the democratic order in Haiti, 
a question, which should have been subject to intense scrutiny by the 
Organization of American States under the OAS Charter or the Inter-
American Democratic Charter. 
II. THE OAS REACTION: SOFT USE OF THE DEMOCRATIC CHARTER 
In this regard, it is useful to compare the reaction of the 
9. See Democratic Charter, supra note 7, art. 1. Due to space constraints, this article 
cannot examine the Haitian crisis in any significant depth. For a brief overview, see, e.g., 
Garry Pierre, Haiti Awaits Deliverance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2004, at A16. For a thorough 
evaluation of the performance of the OAS in building democracy between 1990 and 2000 
(with a brief note on the events of February 2004), see Yasmine Shamsie, Building 'Low-
Intensity' Democracy in Haiti: The OAS Contribution, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 1097 (2004). 
10. Lisa Takeuchi Cullen, A Disputed Departure, TIME, Mar. 15, 2004, at 59. 
11. Id. See also, Jose de Cordoba & Greg Jaffe, Aristide Leaves Haiti Amid Chaos; 
Hundreds of U.S. Marines to Depart for the Country, Joining Peacekeeping Force, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 1, 2004, at A3; see also Jose de Cordoba, Haitian Looters Find Cash Hoard, 
Fueling Charges of Corruption; Rotting Dollars Were Stashed Under Aristide 's Mansion; 
Rebel Soldiers to Disarm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2004, at A14. 
12. For the official U.S. statement describing a "peaceful and constitutional 
succession," see Press Statement, Richard Boucher, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Resignation of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti (Feb. 29, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/29990.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). For the view 
that Aristide's departure was the culmination of a "prolonged ... chronic coup" at the hands 
of the Haitian opposition (the military and the elite), supported by the U.S., see Amy 
Wilentz, Coup in Haiti, THE NATION, Mar. 22, 2004, at 5-6. Cf, Yves Engler, A Denial of 
Beautiful Dreams, THE ECOLOGIST (May 2004), at 16-21. 
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Organization of American States to the events in Haiti in 2004, with its 
more robust reaction to the Venezuelan crisis two years earlier. I3 
A. OAS Reaction to the Venezuelan Crisis in 2002 
On April 11, 2002, President Hugo Chavez Frias was removed 
from office by coup d'etat. Forty-eight hours later, following 
widespread dissatisfaction with the actions of his replacement, Chavez 
was returned to power. I4 The Organization of American States reacted 
swiftly to these events. The OAS Permanent Council met on April 13, 
and issued a Resolution on the "Situation in Venezuela" which 
condemned the "alteration of constitutional order in Venezuela," and 
the related acts of violence. Is Further, under the Resolution a special 
diplomatic mission was sent to investigate and to help mediate the 
situation, and the Permanent Council convoked a special session of the 
General Assembly under Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter. I6 The General Assembly, in its twenty-ninth special session 
considered the report submitted by the Secretary General of the OAS 
and issued a resolution on "Support for Democracy in Venezuela."I 7 By 
this resolution the General Assembly recognized the end of the 
constitutional crisis in Venezuela with the return of Chavez and 
expressed satisfaction at the return of the democratically elected 
President. Is However the General Assembly also put the Chavez 
government on notice that Venezuela, like all OAS Member States, 
remained subject to the norms of the Inter-American Democratic 
13. For contemporary news reports of the coup and counter-coup, see e.g., Marc 
Lifsher, Venezuela's President Chavez Is Ousted in Military Uprising, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 
2002, at Al; Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Americas: Venezuela Rejected a Coup, but Its 
Future Is No Brighter, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at Al 9. 
14. For a colorful account of the events, see, e.g., Report presented by the Permanent 
Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for consideration by the Permanent 
Council of the OAS, The Current Situation in Venezuela, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/CPdoc. 
3616/02 (May 28, 2002) (original in Spanish), 
http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/cpdoc36 l 6_02.htm (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2005). 
15. Situation in Venezuela, Perm. Council Res. of the Organization of American States 
[hereinafter OAS Perm. Council Res.] CPIRES. 811 (1315/02) (Apr. 13, 2002), 
http://www.oas.org/consejo/resolutions/res8 l l .asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
16. Id. 
17. Support for Democracy in Venezuela, OAS G.A. AG/RES. 1 (XXIX-E/02) (Apr. 
18, 2002), http://scm.oas.org/Reference/english/english.htm (Follow "Special Sessions" 
hyperlink; then follow "Twenty-ninth Special Session" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 30, 
2005). 
18. Id. para. 1. 
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Charter, in particular, those set out in Articles 3 and 4. 19 Further, when 
the OAS General Assembly met in its fourth plenary session on June 4, 
2002, it issued a declaration which reiterated both the "OAS' s 
willingness to provide the support and assistance that the Government 
of Venezuela requires to consolidate its democratic process," and its 
"determination to continue applying, without distinction, and in strict 
accordance with the letter and spirit of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, the mechanisms provided for in the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter for the preservation and defense of representative democracy. "20 
The General Assembly also welcomed the national dialogue taking 
place in Venezuela and the decision of the Government to establish a 
Truth Commission to look into the incident. 21 As can be seen in these 
declarations, resolutions, and the related actions of organs of the OAS, 
the Organization actively monitored and assisted in the resolution of the 
Venezuelan situation, constantly using the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter as a reference point. 
B. OAS Reaction to the Haitian Crisis of 2004 
In the case of Haiti in 2004, however, the OAS reaction was 
muted. The Permanent Council had been keeping the situation in Haiti 
on its agenda, as seen in resolutions preceding the incidents of February 
29, 2004. In its resolution of February 26, 2004, for example, the 
Permanent Council recalled several earlier resolutions, emphasized the 
important role of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in helping to 
19. Id. paras. 2-4; see also Democratic Charter, supra note 7, arts. 3 and 4. Articles 3 
and 4 provide: 
Article 3 
Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance 
with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret 
balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, 
the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, and the separation of 
powers and independence of the branches of government. Id. 
Article 4 
Transparency in government activities, probity, responsible public administration on 
the part of governments, respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of 
the press are essential components of the exercise of democracy. 
The constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted 
civilian authority and respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and 
sectors of society are equally essential to democracy. Id. 
20. Declaration on Democracy in Venezuela, OAS G.A. AG/DEC. 28 (XXXII-0/02) 
(June 4, 2002), paras. 1 and 2, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga02/agdec_28.htm (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
21. Id. paras. 3-4. 
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resolve the crisis, including the CARICOM Plan, and called upon the 
U .N. Security Council "to take the necessary and appropriate urgent 
measures" to address the situation. 22 The Permanent Council also 
reaffirmed "its support for the OAS Special Mission in Haiti and its 
activities in accordance with all relevant OAS resolutions, and, in 
particular, its support for the CARICOM initiative, designed to promote 
a solution to the situation in Haiti."23 No reference was made to the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter in this resolution. Following 
Aristide's departure on February 29, 2004, the Permanent Council did 
not issue any resolutions regarding the incident, and the OAS General 
Assembly only did so during its fourth plenary session several months 
later, on June 8, 2004.24 
This latter resolution is fascinating in its treatment of the crisis. 
Paragraphs of the resolution's preamble describe Aristide's "abrupt 
departure," note the "subsequent questions" surrounding Aristide's 
resignation, and emphasize that there "was an alteration of the 
constitutional regime, which began prior to February 29, 2004, and 
which has damaged the democratic order in Haiti due to the 
nonexistence of a functioning parliament or democratically elected 
municipal authorities or an independent and free judiciary."25 
Cumulatively, these and other statements by the General Assembly in 
the resolution should have provided the platform for a robust invocation 
of the Democratic Charter, including use of Articles 19-22, as occurred 
in the Venezuelan context. 
They almost did. In accordance with the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter the General Assembly called for new elections as 
soon as possible and requested the OAS Special Mission for 
Strengthening Democracy in Haiti to assist with those elections.26 The 
General Assembly also mandated the Permanent Council, in accordance 
with Article 20 of the Democratic Charter, to undertake diplomatic 
initiatives to foster restoration of democracy in Haiti, and called for "the 
rapid normalization of democratic institutions in Haiti consistent with 
22. Situation in Haiti, OAS Perm. Council Res. CPIRES. 862 (1401104) (Feb. 26, 
2004), para. 1, http://www.oas.org/consejo/resolutions/res862.asp (last visited Dec. 30, 
2005). 
23. Id. para. 2. 
24. Situation in Haiti: Strengthening of Democracy, OAS G.A. AG/RES. 2058 
(XXXIV-0/04) (Jun. 8, 2004), http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ag02528e08.doc (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. paras. 1-2. 
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the Inter-American Democratic Charter."27 However the 'teeth' of the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, the portions of Articles 20-21, 
which allow special meetings of the Permanent Council and the General 
Assembly in order to suspend a Member State from the exercise of its 
right to participate in the OAS, were never utilized.28 
C. Comparison and Assessment 
These OAS reactions to the Haitian crisis were useful, but differed 
in two ways from their actions to the Venezuelan coup and counter-
coup. Firstly, regarding timing, the OAS General Assembly and 
Permanent Council did not actively address the Haitian situation until 
months later. Secondly, regarding substance, there was no attempt to 
establish what actually happened on February 29, 2004. No new fact 
finding mission was sent to Haiti, nor is there a record of the OAS 
Special Mission in Haiti being asked to clarify the events. This is 
important because during and after the Venezuelan incident all parties 
emphasized the need to establish an accurate understanding of the 
sequence of the events and the actors involved. In addition, the OAS 
did not suspend Haiti's voting rights with the provisions of the Inter-
American Democratic Charter. 
These differences may be explained in part by the fact that the 
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the 
U.N Charter, issued a resolution on the day of Aristide's departure, 
which appeared to legitimize President Boniface Alexandre as the 
acting President of Haiti. 29 Chapter VII decisions, of course, are 
binding on all U.N. Member States.30 In light of this, perhaps the OAS 
merely recognized Aristide's departure as a fait accompli. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that this Security Council resolution could 
be viewed as prohibiting or otherwise restricting the OAS from 
initiating an investigation of the events surrounding Aristide' s 
departure, as expressly called for by CARICOM and as envisaged in the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter. 
27. Id. paras. 4 and 6. 
28. Democratic Charter, supra note 7, arts. 20-21. 
29. S.C. Res. 1529, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004). 
30. See U.N. Charter art. 25: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." Id. 
See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 19711.C.J. 16 (June 21). 
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Ill. THE CARICOM REACTION 
A. Need for Investigation of Haitian Events 
In contrast, CARICOM's efforts to establish the truth of what 
happened on February 28-29, 2004, is to be commended.31 Haiti, a very 
recent member of the Caribbean Community (from July 2, 2002), is 
subject to the democracy-related rights and values of the Charter of 
Civil Society, a document adopted by a resolution of the Community's 
highest organ, the Conference of Heads of Government. 32 Invoking the 
31. CARICOM's Member States are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. For further 
information about CARICOM, see generally http://www.caricom.org. For an introduction 
to the new constituent treaty, the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, see David S. Berry, The 
New Caribbean Community: An Introduction to the Institutional Changes in the Revised 
Treaty ofChaguaramas, 7 CARIBBEAN L. BULL. l, 1-58 (2002). 
32. Although the provisions of the Charter are persuasive rather than binding, they do 
exert a normative force over Community affairs, see Charter of Civil Society for the 
Caribbean Community [hereinafter The Charter of Civil Society], 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/chartercivilsocietyresolution.jsp? 
menu=secretariat (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). The Charter was adopted at the Eighth Inter-
Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government, on February 19, 1997, by a 
resolution of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community. Id. 
The Charter guarantees a variety of human rights, including civil and political rights and 
economic, social and cultural ones. The relevant portions of Articles 6 and 17 of the Charter 
provide: 
ARTICLE VI 
Political Rights 
1. The States shall ensure the existence of a fair and open democratic system 
through the holding of free elections at reasonable intervals, by secret ballot, 
underpinned by an electoral system in which all can have confidence and which will 
ensure the free expression of the will of the people in the choice of their 
representatives. 
2. The States shall take all appropriate measures to promote and maintain an 
effectively functioning representational system, including the holding of regular 
public sessions of representatives of the people .... Id. 
ARTICLE XVII 
Good Governance 
1. The States shall adopt and implement all appropriate measures to ensure good 
governance which is just, open and accountable. 
2. The States recognise and affirm that the rule of law, the effective administration 
of justice and the maintenance of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary 
are essential to good governance. 
7. The States in order to further the participation of the people in the democratic 
process shall establish effective systems of ongoing consultations between the 
Government and the people. 
Article 26, entitled "Implementation," provides: "The States declare their resolve to pay due 
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Charter of Civil Society, CARICOM's response to Aristide's departure 
was swift. The Community's Conference of Heads of Government met 
in an emergency session on March 2-3, 2004, and issued a statement 
refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Haitian rebel forces or to 
participate in the Multinational Interim Force.33 The Conference also 
expressed clear concern about the non-democratic transition in Haiti as 
setting a dangerous precedent, one promoting "the unconstitutional 
removal of duly elected persons from office. "34 Referring to Inter-
American and Caribbean democratic norms, the conference noted "the 
contradictory reports surrounding the demission from office of the 
constitutionally elected President . . . [and the] assertions made by 
President Aristide that he had not demitted office voluntarily," and 
called for . a full investigation. 35 Shortly thereafter, Jamaican Prime 
Minister Patterson invited Aristide to visit Jamaica on compassionate 
grounds to be reunited with his family.36 This visit was not welcomed 
by the interim head of the administration of Haiti, Mr. Gerard Latorture, 
who made public statements about the "freezing of relations with 
Jamaica" and the "putting to sleep ofrelations with CARICOM."37 This 
reaction hardened the position of CARICOM, which did not invite the 
Haitian interim administration to attend the next Inter-Sessional 
Meeting of the Conference, held on March 29, 2004.38 As noted in the 
Communique issued at the end of that meeting, although Haiti remained 
a CARICOM Member State, the Haitian interim administration was not 
invited to participate in the meetings of the main organs of the 
Community.39 However, CARICOM maintained its active involvement 
with Haiti by reconstituting its Core Group of Prime Ministers on Haiti, 
designating a Special Envoy to help advance Community interests, and 
regard to the provisions of this Charter." 
Id. 
33. Press Release, CARI COM, Statement Issued by CARI COM Heads of Government 
at the Conclusion of an Emergency Session on the Situation in Haiti (Mar. 3, 2004), 
www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres22_04.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Press Release, CARICOM, Statement by the Most Honourable P.J. Patterson, 
Prime Minister of Jamaica, on the Hosting of Former President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide (Mar. 11, 2004), www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres34_04.htm (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2005). 
37. Press Release, CARICOM, Statement on Haiti Issued by the Fifteenth Inter-
Sessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Gov't of the Caribbean Cmty. (Mar. 
29, 2004), www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres49_04.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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establishing a Task Force to coordinate assistance.4° CARICOM also 
continued to press for an investigation of the circumstances surrounding 
Aristide's departure, first before the U.N., and later before the OAS-
specifically seeking to invoke Article 20 of the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter before the OAS Permanent Council.41 Despite the 
inability of Haiti to participate in CARICOM organs, relations between 
the Community and the Transitional Government in Haiti continued and 
were described by the CARICOM Secretary General as "close and 
productive."42 In fact the return of Haiti to the Councils of CARICOM 
was stated to be "a most compelling issue" by the new Chairman of the 
Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR).43 Yet as of 
June 2005 Haiti was still excluded from meetings of CARI COM organs. 
There was no evidence of any change in this position by January 2006. 
Haiti's continued exclusion was explained by the Chairman of 
COFCOR, the Honorable Dame Billie Miller, at the open debate at the 
United Nations Security Council on Haiti, in January 2005.44 In her 
statement Dame Miller noted that CARICOM had been actively 
involved in Haiti prior to Aristide's removal with three goals: 
stabilizing the political situation through power sharing, preventing the 
traditional Haitian practice of removing Presidents in order to resolve 
political conflicts, and helping the Haitians find a peaceful political 
solution which would preserve the rule of law and ensure constitutional 
continuity. Noting the departure of the elected President "in 
circumstances still to be elucidated," she explained: 
[I]n the view of CARICOM, the fundamental tenets of democratic 
practice and behaviour had been compromised. We cannot vacillate on 
principle since it is essential to our security as small states. Continuing 
violations of the principles laid down in the CARICOM Charter of 
40. Id. 
41 . Press Release, Conclusion of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Bureau of the 
Conference of the Heads Gov't of the Caribbean Cmty. (May 5, 2004), 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres69_04.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
42. Press Release, CARICOM, Sec'y Gen. Denies Media Report on Haiti (June 24, 
2004), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres100_04.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 
2005). 
43. Press Release, Communique issued at the Conclusion of the Eighth Meeting of the 
Council for Foreign and Cmty. Relations (COFCOR) (June 3, 2005), 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres123_05.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
44. Press Release, Hon. Dame Billie Miller, Statement on Behalf of the Caribbean 
Cmty. at the Open Debate at the United Nations Sec. Council on the Situation in Haiti (Jan. 
12, 2005), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres19_05.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 
2005). 
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Civil Society have made it impossible for the Community to receive 
representatives of Haiti in its Councils. The interim administration 
must be held to internationally recognized standards with regard to 
respect for fundamental civil and political rights, due process, and the 
rule oflaw.45 
In sum, CARICOM has taken a principled position with respect to 
the non-democratic transition in Haiti. It has continued to provide 
assistance within Haiti and has constantly kept the Haitian situation on 
its agenda. However it has not allowed the Interim Administration to 
attend any of the meetings of principal CARI COM organs. 
B. Failure of Procedural Democracy 
Although CARICOM may have emphasized the substantive values 
of democracy to a greater extent than the OAS in calling for a full 
investigation of the transition, it has been less meritorious in following 
its own democratic, procedural requirements. In fact, all of the formal 
decisions regarding Haitian participation were taken at meetings of 
CARICOM organs without Haiti being present. This is contrary to the 
voting provisions in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, which provide 
very limited grounds for exclusion of Member States.46 Not one of 
these grounds concerns non-democratic transitions.47 Under 
CARICOM voting procedures, Haiti could only be excluded from 
participation in the Conference if it was either a party to a dispute, or if 
45. Id. 
46. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including 
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, Jul. 5, 2001 [hereinafter Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas ], http://www.caricom.org/j sp/secretariat/legal_instruments/revisedtreaty. pdf 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2005). The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas is not yet in force, but it 
has been ratified, and is being provisionally applied, by twelve CARICOM Member States. 
See, Protocol on the Provisional Application of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Feb. 5, 
2002, 
http://www.caricom.org/j sp/secretariat/legal_instruments/revtreatyprovappl_protocol.j sp?m 
enu=secretariat (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). Haiti has signed the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas, but has not yet ratified it or signed the Protocol on Provisional Application; 
The Bahamas has not yet signed the Revised Treaty; Montserrat is awaiting a decision from 
the UK ("entrustment") as to its ability to participate in the Revised Treaty regime. See, 
CARICOM Secretariat, Establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
(updated Aug. 10, 2005), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/csmekeyelements.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2006). 
47. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 46, art. 27(2) (allowing suspension of 
voting rights of Member States "whose contributions to the regular budget of the 
Community are in arrears for more than two years"). 
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sanctions were being considered against it.48 It is doubtful whether 
Haiti could be excluded from a meeting of one of the other Ministerial 
Councils.49 Since the Charter of Civil Society is not binding, it would 
be difficult to argue that a breach of its provisions on democracy or 
good governance would merit suspension. As a result, Haiti should 
have been invited to attend any CARICOM meeting which discussed 
the events of February 2004, and should have been able to present its 
case for continued participation. Of course at the end of such a meeting, 
the organs of CARI COM could have voted to exclude Haiti's continued 
participation, but at least Haiti, as a Member State, would have been 
entitled to take part in the deliberative processes. 
As a result, even though CARICOM has gone much further than 
the OAS in attempting to uphold the full substance of the democratic 
rights and values protected by, inter alia, the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter, it failed to satisfy its own voting requirements. It 
also may have violated the good governance provisions of its Charter of 
Civil Society.50 At the organizational level this produces an ironic 
democratic deficit. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the Organization of American States and the Caribbean 
Community have grappled with the difficulties of trying to apply 
democratic norms in the extreme situation of a non-democratic change 
in government. Both organizations have been partly successful. 
However, each organization has failed to uphold some of the democratic 
values and procedures established in its own constituent treaty and 
related documents. The OAS failed to uphold the substantive values or 
apply the full mechanisms of the Inter-American Democratic Charter; 
CARICOM failed to uphold the procedural voting rights of its 
membership. 
Whether either of these failures has had a significant effect upon 
the efforts to restore democracy in Haiti is yet to be known. Both 
CARICOM and the OAS have continued their active involvement in 
Haiti, and each has joined the U.N. in assisting with the preparations for 
48. Id. art. 28(4). 
49. By allowing issues of "critical importance" to be subject to unanimous voting, the 
Revised Treaty implicitly would prevent the exclusion of a Member State from a meeting 
where such an issue arises in relation to itself, as would have been the case for Haiti. See id. 
art. 29(3). 
50. The Charter of Civil Society, supra note 32. Article XVII(l) may be read to extend 
to state behavior before the organs of CARI COM. Id. 
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elections.51 But the challenges facing Haiti remain severe. U.N. 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has suggested that "[a] long term 
effort-10 years or more-is needed to help rebuild the police and 
judiciary, as well as basic social services such as health care and 
education."52 Moreover, the challenge of entrenching fundamental 
democratic values within Haiti remains daunting. As this article 
suggests, this challenge is not confined to Haiti alone. 
51. See e.g., Press Release, CARICOM Task Force, An Indispensable Tool in Regional 
Response to Haiti (June 2, 2005), 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/presl 18_05.htm; see also, Press Release, OAS, 
OAS and U.N. Working Together to Ensure Elections in Haiti (Jan. 11, 2005), 
http://www.oas.org (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "2005," "Jan.," and 
then "E-006 January 11, 2005" hyperlinks) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
52. Kofi A. Annan, In Haiti for the Long Haul, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2004, at A20. 
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